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> abstract • In this commentary I main-
tain that in order to improve the dialec-
tical approaches of cognition by using 
the Hegelian concept of the dialectical 
process it is necessary to take into ac-
count Hartmann’s ontology of proces-
sual being.
the necessity of improving 
the dialectical approaches 
of cognition by the tradition 
of german philosophy
« 1 » i totally agree with the statement 
in nicolas Zaslawski’s target article that 
the elaboration of dialectical approaches 
of cognition is the best way to avoid the 
theoretical trap of all extreme standpoints 
(like reductionism and antireductionism) 
in contemporary cognitive science and 
philosophy of mind. indeed, the need for 
such approaches has already been noticed 
but, as the author convincingly argues, in 
current cognitive science and philosophy 
of mind there is still no clearly defined con-
cept of the dialectical process. one has to 
agree, as well, that in order to change this 
situation a deep analysis of Hegel’s phi-
losophy is required. Hegel, creator of the 
modern notion of dialectics, is still rarely 
mentioned in contemporary discussion on 
mind and cognition. But – and this is not a 
criticism of the target article but rather an 
addition – this problem also concerns the 
whole tradition of the German philosophy 
in which the Hegelian dialectical approach 
to cognition was creatively developed (like 
Marburgian neo-Kantianism and espe-
cially nicolai Hartmann’s philosophy). in 
order to use the Hegelian understanding of 
the dialectical process to describe neuro-
cognitive processes, we cannot ignore this 
tradition.
hartmann’s ontology of processual 
being
« 2 » at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury Hartmann, reconciling Hegel’s philoso-
phy, Marburgian neo-Kantian philosophy of 
science and phenomenological approaches, 
created the pluralistic, dynamical and rela-
tional ontology of processual being, which 
can be used to explain…
“ continuity between natural, social, and cultural 
world’ […] through a dialectical expansion from 
individuals to institutions by an ongoing ‘back-
and-forth’ externalization and internalization 
process”
as Zaslawski writes in §54. He was the first 
to use Hegel’s mostly speculative analysis to 
systematize the results of the empirical sci-
ences.
« 3 » Hartmann describes empirical 
forms of Hegelian Aufhebung. He shows 
and ontologically explains the insepara-
bility of processes of being and cognition 
(Hartmann 1921). He also criticizes all 
extreme positions (all “isms”), and rejects 
both monism and Cartesian dualism in 
favor of his ontology (Hartmann 1935, 
1953, 1964). The importance of his analy-
sis of the dialectical relationship between 
the personal spirit (individual subject) and 
the objective spirit (culture, society) (Hart-
mann 1949), in which he uses the Hegelian 
conceptual framework to describe concrete 
empirical processes, cannot be overesti-
mated. He also redefines classical modal 
notions like possibility, actuality and ne-
cessity (and their opposites: impossibility, 
nonactuality, contingency) in the context 
of the ontology of processual being (Hart-
mann 1938).
« 4 » Hartmann’s processual and rela-
tional ontology can also be explored in the 
constructivist approaches because it is situ-
ated beyond the metaphysical opposition 
of realism and idealism (Hartmann 1958; 
Peterson 2012). in reference to Kant’s criti-
cal philosophy, Hartmann creates the new 
critical concept of “reality” or “real being” 
(Hartmann 1953: 23–31). “real being” 
means simply “temporal and processual be-
ing” and is opposed to “ideal being” which 
means “eternal, unchanging being.” More-
over, Hartmann’s ontology of spiritual be-
ing is relevant for constructivist approaches 
because it shows that the spiritual being is a 
social construct.
« 5 » There are a lot of elements in 
Hartmann’s ontology that can and should 
be explored by contemporary philosophy 
of mind and the cognitive sciences. due to 
space limitations here, i will present just 
these two, which are the most useful for the 
subject matter of the dialectical process.
hartmann analyses of the 
dialectical relation between 
objective and personal spirit
« 6 » according to Hartmann (1949: 
198), the discovery of the objective spirit 
was Hegel’s greatest achievement, but “great 
explorers are seldom aware of what they 
have discovered”1 (Hartmann 1949: 197, my 
translation). dialectics is not a philosophi-
cal method but movement in the path of 
the spirit itself. it is the reason why, in or-
der to capture the essence of the dialectical 
process, we should not study Hegel’s Science 
of Logic, where he tries to explain it him-
self, but rather his Phenomenology of Spirit, 
where he grasps and describes the dialecti-
cal processes that occur in spiritual being 
(Hartmann 1957).
« 7 » Hartmann also argues that Hegel’s 
descriptions of particular spiritual phe-
nomena such as law, state, art, philosophy, 
and religion cannot be overestimated. By 
studying them, one can grasp the meaning 
of genuine dialectical processes. in his arti-
cle Hegel und das Problem der Realdialektik 
Hartmann writes:
“ dialectics is clearly rooted in the philosophy of 
the spirit (mind). Here it grows out of the rela-
tionship to the object, indeed from its own objec-
tive structure. one has to look at this area if one 
wants to understand it. Here it has achievements 
that have nothing to do with the metaphysical 
assumptions of rational idealism.” (Hartmann 
1957: 324, my translation)2
1 | “die großen Entdecker wissen es selten, 
was sie entdecken.”
2 | “die dialektik wurzelt eindeutig in der 
Geistesphilosophie. Hier wächst sie aus dem ver-
hältnis zum Gegenstande, ja aus seiner eigenen 
objektiven struktur heraus. auf dieses Gebiet muß 
man hinblicken, wenn man ihr gerecht werden 
will. Hier hat sie Errungenschaften aufzuweisen, 
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« 8 » However, in his philosophy of ob-
jective spirit, Hegel made one serious mis-
take. He claimed that objective spirit has its 
own consciousness. But consciousness is a 
feature of a personal spirit and that is why 
the objective spirit is dialectically connected 
with the personal one. Hartmann’s analyses 
of the relation between the subjective (per-
sonal) and objective spirit are crucial for 
understanding the essence of the dialectical 
process. This is a genuine dialectical rela-
tion, which means that the objective spirit 
(culture) and the personal spirit (concrete 
subject) exist only in an intimate relation-
ship. on the one hand, each personal spirit 
is determined by the objective spirit (culture 
and society) in which it lives; on the other 
hand – contrary to Hegel’s philosophy – the 
objective spirit – both in its content and in 
its existence – depends on the existence of 
personal spirits who create it and who are its 
bearers (Hartmann 1949). Hartmann’s ana-
lyzes of this relation in Das Problem des geis-
tigen Seins (ibid) find their confirmation in 
the field of sociology of knowledge (Berger 
& Luckmann 1966).
« 9 » The understanding of the rela-
tionship within the spiritual being helps to 
understand the ongoing dialectics of knowl-
edge and the object of the knowledge that 
Hegel calls “experience.” The object of the 
knowledge is part of the objective spirit, 
it is an object as described by current sci-
ence. When the individual consciousness 
(personal spirit) makes cognitive prog-
ress, it changes in consequence the content 
of the object of knowledge (the content of 
the science as a part of the objective spirit). 
But the relation is mutual because the indi-
vidual spirit always starts its cognition with 
the current content of the objective spirit in 
which it is living. (The cognitive progress al-
ways starts from some point and is strictly 
related to it.)
« 10 » in Marburgian neo-Kantinianism 
there was the important dispute of how to 
understand the “fact of science” (“das Fak-
tum der Wissenschaft”). Herman Cohen, the 
founder of the Marburgian school, defines 
the “fact of science” as the results of the pro-
cess of cognition – the “state” of knowledge 
that is recognized as valid in some specific 
die mit den metaphysischen voraussetzungen des 
vernunft-idealismus nichts zu tun haben.”
time and place (Cohen 1918). But for his 
student, Paul natorp, the “fact of science” 
was the endless process of becoming – the 
process of scientific cognition, which he 
called the “unending Fieri of cultural cre-
ation” (“ewige Fieri des Kulturschaffens”) 
(natorp 1912: 213). Hartmann shows that 
these seemingly contradictory two ways 
of understanding science, knowledge and 
culture can be reconciled in the dialectical 
unity of spiritual being, which is composed 
by three parts: personal, objective and objec-
tified spirit (Hartmann 1949). The results 
of scientific cognition, which represents 
the current state of the knowledge, are ob-
jectivizing in objectified spirit (books, theo-
ries, systems). it is the “static” part of the 
spirit that is a necessary starting point for 
the further development of knowledge for 
every personal individual spirit. But since 
human cognition never ends, the objective 
spirit, just like a personal spirit, is always in 
the process of becoming. Both, the personal 
spirit and the objective spirit, are “living” 
spirits, while the objectified spirit is not “liv-
ing.” The objectified spirit is ontologically 
dependent on the existence of some specific 
personal and objective spirits. This does not 
mean that we can deny that in some way it 
is “existing” and ipso facto related to these 
other two.
hartmann’s interpretation of the 
“aufhebung”
« 11 » in Hartmann’s ontology of multi-
layer processual being we can also find the 
detailed explanation and exemplification of 
Hegelian “Aufhebung.” The Hegelian notion 
“Aufhebung” – as Zaslawski rightly points 
out – combines two moments (or dimen-
sions): “suppression” and “conservation.” 
The main issue is then how to reconcile 
these two seemingly contradictory mo-
ments. to explain the process of “Aufhe-
bung,” which is the essence of all dialectic 
processes, Hartmann conducts his ontologi-
cal analyses not at the separate-layers level 
but at the categories level. The distinction 
between fundamental and special categories 
(Hartmann 1953: 62–72, 1964: 157–374), as 
well as Hartmann’s categorial laws (Hart-
mann 1953: 75–76, 1964: 375–522), make it 
possible to combine pluralism of the world 
with its unity and to avoid falling into the 
trap of the monism-pluralism dichotomy.
« 12 » However, what seems very impor-
tant is that in Hartmann’s ontology one finds 
a distinction that can be understood as the 
distinction of two types of “Aufhebung.” Let 
me briefly present Hartmann’s ontological 
framework to explain this distinction. There 
are four levels (layers, strata) of being in 
Hartmann’s ontology (listing from the low-
est to the highest): the inanimate, the bio-
logical (organic), the psychological and the 
spiritual. The order of these layers (strata) 
has two meanings: first of all, it presents the 
succession in which they appeared in the 
process of evolution, secondly, it presents 
the system of categorical relations between 
them. on the one hand, the existence of the 
layer that appeared later (the higher one) 
depends on the existence of the layer that 
appeared first (the lower one) but not vice 
versa. For example, without inanimate be-
ing there would be no organic being, but in-
animate being can exist without any organic 
being. on the other hand, the matter (the 
being so, Sosein) of the higher layer is not 
reduced to the lower one. in other words, we 
are not able to completely understand and 
explain the higher layer by referring to the 
laws and categories discovered at the lower 
layer. For example, we cannot reduce organ-
ic being to inanimate being, because in each 
subsequent higher layer there is always some 
categorical novelty. in each higher layer the 
lower one is “aufgehoben”: part of its content 
is preserved and part is rejected. These rules 
are expressed in two categorial principles – 
the principle of stratification (Grundsatz der 
Schichtung), which is afterwards specified 
in the laws of the categorial stratification 
(Gesetze der kategorialen Schichtung), and 
the principle of dependence (Grundsatz der 
Dependenz), which is specified in the laws 
of the categorical dependence (Gesetze der 
kategorialen Dependenz).3 The principle of 
stratification says:
“ Categories of the lower layers are largely con-
tained in the higher layers, but not conversely.” 
(Hartmann 1964: 381, my translation)4
3 | More details on categorical rights see 
Hartmann (1964: 375–253, 1953: 84–98).
4 | “Kategorien der niederen schichten sind 
weitgehend in den höheren schichten enthalten, 
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« 13 » The principle of dependence says:
“ There are only one-sided dependences: the de-
pendence of the higher categories upon the low-
er; but this is only a partial dependence; it leaves 
much scope for the autonomy of the higher cat-
egories.” (Hartmann 1964: 381, my translation)5
« 14 » But, and this is an important 
point according to Hartmann, there are two 
possible relations between two subsequent 
layers, so we can say two types of “Auf-
hebung”: the relation of super-formation 
(Überformung) and the relation of super-
position (Überbauung).6 The relation of 
super-formation occurs only between the 
two lower layers of “real being”: the inani-
mate one and the organic one. The essence 
of this relation is that “forms” of the lower 
layer become the “matter” of the higher one, 
which has its own higher forms. Hartmann 
describes this relation in detail:
“ The living organism does not simply grow out 
of the inanimate being and its laws, but contains 
both in itself; it is a spatial and corporal structure, 
it has weight and inertia like any other physical 
body, and its cells are made up of atoms. The liv-
ing organism is certainly much more than all that 
but it does not get rid of it, does not leave it be-
hind. it preserves it, merely ‘super-forms’ (‘über-
formt’) it and makes of these elements something 
higher. This relation of super-formation shows 
clearly where the autonomy of the higher struc-
ture lies and how the higher structure retains 
the specificity of the lower elements to which 
the higher form is applied. The laws, and the cat-
egories of the physical being retain their validity, 
they are the same in the living organism, and they 
cannot be canceled even by the novelty of the 
super-formation, because they are even stronger 
thanks to it. Thus the autonomy of the living or-
ganism is a very limited one.” (Hartmann 1949: 
67, my translation)7
5 | “abhängigkeit besteht nur einseitig als 
die der höheren Kategorien von den niederen; 
aber sie ist bloß partiale abhängigkeit, sie läßt der 
Eigenständigkeit der höheren Kategorien weiten 
spielraum.”
6 | i use roberto Poli’s translation of Hart-
mann’s terms “Überformung” and “Überbauung” 
(Poli 2011: 21).
7 | “der organismus geht zwar im Materiel-
len und seiner Gesetzlichkeit nicht auf, aber er 
« 15 » But in the case of the higher lay-
ers, the relationship that connects them is 
different. Between organic being and psy-
chological being as well as between psycho-
logical and spiritual being there occurs the 
relation of super-position. The relation of 
super-position is essentially different. Hart-
mann explains:
“ What differentiates super-position from super-
formation is that the forms of the lower layer do 
not become building blocks of higher formations, 
but the higher layer has its own, stricter form. in 
other words: not all of the lower categories come 
back in the higher layer, some of them stay be-
hind; the return of the categories is curtailed.” 
(Hartmann 1949: 68, my translation) 8
« 16 » The process of “Aufhebung” in 
the higher layers of being is much more 
complicated. There is still some kind of 
foundation. Psychic life is dependent on 
organic being and, indirectly, on the in-
animate being. spirit is dependent on the 
whole ladder of low strata. But this is an-
other kind of dependence. one of the most 
important points made by Hartmann is that 
the two highest layers (the psychological 
being and the spiritual being) are neither 
enthält beides doch in sich; er ist ein räumlich 
körperhaftes Gebilde, hat schwere und trägheit 
wie jeder andere physische Körper auch, seine 
Zellen bestehen aus atomen. der organismus ist 
gewißt mehr als das alles, aber er streift es nicht 
ab, läßt es nicht hinter sich. Er behält es bei, er 
‘überformt’ es nur, bildet daraus wie aus Element-
en etwas Höheres. dieses Überformungsverhält-
nis zeigt deutlich, wo seine autonomie liegt, und 
wie sie an die Eigenart der niederen Elemente 
rückgebunden bleibt, denen sie die höhere For-
mumg aufprägt. die Gesetze, die Kategorien des 
Physischen bleiben in Kraft, sie ragen gleichsam 
in den organismus hinein, können auch durch 
das novum der Überformung nicht aufgehoben 
werden; denn sie sind ja die stärkeren. so ist die 
autonomie des organismus eine sehr begrenzte.”
8 | “Wo Überbauung durch Überformung 
abgelöst ist, da werden die Formen der niederen 
schicht nicht zu Bausteinen der höheren For-
mung, sondern diese hat ihre eigene, strengerer 
Form auch so aussprechen: die niederen Kat-
egorien dringen in der höheren schicht nicht alle 
durch, sie bleiben zurück, ihre Wiederkehr bricht 
ab.”
spatial nor material. These two categories 
(space and matter) are not to be found in 
these layers of being. in consequence, ques-
tions such as “Where is the mind located?” 
or “is the mind located in the brain” do not 
make any sense. The distinction between 
these two kinds of “Aufhebug” is important 
because:
“ This is the reason why the methods developed 
in analogy to the study of physical laws could not 
been established in psychology.” (Hartmann 
1949: 68, my translation)9
« 17 » in order to explore the relation-
ship between any two ontological layers and 
thus to understand the process of “Aufhe-
bung,” one has to develop detailed analyses 
of the categories that we use to describe the 
world. and – as Hartmann claims – because 
of the dialectical and processual character of 
our cognition, the ontology captured by sci-
ences and philosophy is always temporary 
and has to be corrected according to the 
progress of our cognition.
« 18 » one can ask whether Hartmann’s 
distinction of these two modes of “Aufhe-
bung”: super-formation and super-position, 
is still valid according to our current state of 
scientific knowledge or whether it should be 
corrected. Perhaps there are more types of 
“Aufhebung.” in any case there is an impor-
tant lesson to be learned from Hartmann’s 
ontology if we want to adopt a Hegelian 
notion of the dialectical process. The unity 
of the world, including physical, organic, 
psychological and spiritual (cultural) being, 
does not necessarily mean the ontological 
superiority of any of these layers. There is a 
“continuity between [the] natural, social, and 
cultural world” but to capture it one needs to 
take into account the specificity of each of 
these layers. The object of the philosophy 
of mind and cognitive science is most com-
plicated because the human mind is a four-
layer being: we have to know not only the 
laws and categories of all of these four layers 
(and maybe there are even more layers) but 
also, and above all, the laws of dependence 
between the categories of different layers.
9 | “das ist der Grund, warum die nach 
analogie physikalischer Gesetzforschung arbei-
tenden Methoden sich in der Psychologie nicht 
haben halten können.”
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conclusion
« 19 » i agree with most of Zaslawski’s 
conclusions, especially concerning the im-
plications of the dialectical approach for 
such issues as a concept of subject, concept 
of the extended mind or extended model of 
cognition. Hegel’s philosophy can be suc-
cessfully explored for the conceptual im-
provement of the so-called “E-approaches” 
in cognitive sciences and philosophy of 
mind. The improvement of dialectical ap-
proaches could certainly also contribute in 
sociology and psychology.
« 20 » since the ontology of proces-
sual or relational being has its philosophi-
cal history, the contemporary philosophy 
of cognitive and social sciences should try 
to build upon its achievements. utilizing 
the Hegelian understanding of the dialec-
tical process can be seen as great progress 
in the development of the relationship be-
tween empirical cognitive sciences and 
these achievements. The greatest value of 
the target article is therefore an indication 
of the necessity of including a recognition 
of classic German philosophy to improve 
dialectical approaches to cognition, which 
may and, i hope, will become the dominant 
paradigm in cognitive science in the near 
future.
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> abstract • By taking the proposal of 
a neurodialectical move seriously, I an-
ticipate three interconnected questions 
that might appear if the program of-
fered here is expanded to a social scope, 
namely regarding the specific dialectics 
the social could imply, the important dis-
tinction and articulation of two different 
aspects of the social, and the originarity 
of neurodialectics.
« 1 » The very interesting “neurodia-
lectical move” the target article by nicolas 
Zaslawski provides us with entails, as he 
stresses himself, implications for multiple 
scientific fields, including, and probably 
especially, the social sciences, with regard 
to its Hegelian foundations. indeed, the 
dialectical process he carefully defines from 
Hegel’s work in dialogue with Francisco va-
rela’s neurophenomenology is designed to 
shed new light, not only on the conceptual 
relation between brain and mind within the 
well-known “mind-body” debate, but also 
on the potential relation between individu-
als and sociological “entities” (§55), which 
has been haunting sociology for more than 
a century. By taking his ambitious proposal 
seriously, my commentary aims at antici-
pating some issues that might appear if one 
wants to expand the neurodialectical ap-
proach “to a social scope” (§54).
« 2 » in order to foresee some of these 
issues, let us first briefly return to Hegel’s 
example given in the article, about the trans-
formations of a plant, to illustrate the dia-
lectical processes, which designate the “fluid 
nature” or the “fluid braid” of every natural 
form, each one understood as a “moment of 
an organic unity” (Hegel §21). in the case 
of the plant, the dialectical process enables 
one to grasp the movement, which starts 
with the bud, then gives rise to a blossom, 
which will become a fruit whose seeds will 
